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The foreign sector long has been important in Chilean resource allocation
among sectors and subsectors. Before the Great Depression, substantial re-
source movements accompanied the rise and fall of nitrates and the decline
and resurgence of copper, to cite but two examples. In that era the govern-
ment also consciously used the international economic regime to promote
industrial import substitution (see section 1.2).
The catastrophic impact of the Great Depression greatly strengthened ex-
port pessimism (sections 1.3 and 1.4). The nation turned inward. The govern-
ment utilized numerous foreign-sector policy tools to try to induce resource t
shifts into industry (Chapters 3 and 4). The impact of those policies on PLD- t
EERs, ITRs, EPRs, and DRCs after the Second World War was analyzed in
Chapter 5.Amajor characteristic of these price-related measures is the sub-
stantial variation in their applicability to different production sectors and
subsectors and different end uses. Trade barriers have been highest for maim- 1
facturing and lowest for mining, with agriculture in between. Within industry
they have been greatest for the traditional "easy" consumer-oriented subsectors
(at least until the late 1960s). They also have been higher for consumer 1
productsthan for intermediate or investment goods. Finally, the price-related S
measures generally have favored import substitution over export expansion.
The general patterns noted in the previous paragraph have persisted
throughout recent decades. Distortions in the signals for product use and in
• the rate of transformation between domestic and foreign resources, therefore, e
also have persisted. The degree of discrimination among categories, however,
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has varied significantly. Liberalization has tended to reduce discrepancies 1and
vice versa.
These patterns and variations in the price-related measures raise several
questions: (i) What have been the long-run trends and phase-related move-
ments in resource allocation? (ii) What has been the relation between ratios
of the prices of final product to intermediate inputs and resource allocation?
(iii) What have been the costs of the attempts to alter resource allocation by
using the international economic regime to create differential incentives?
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
i.Secular trends in the composition of output have included declines in the
shares of agriculture and mining, increases in industry until the early 1950s,
and increases in all other sectors. Discriminatory aspects of the international
economic regimes have contributed to the declines in the first two sectors and
to the initial rise in industry. The lack of correlation between import-substitu-
tion coefficients and industrial subsectoral growth, however, suggest that in
manufacturing, foreign-sector policies may have been less important than is
on often claimed. Overvaluation has helped to induce the shift from goods to
services, although increased quantitative restrictions have tended to work in
the other direction.
ii. The secular declines in agriculture and mining have increased pressure
DIe on the balance of payments. In this respect the industrialization strategy has
added to foreign-sector difficulties.
iii. Phase-associated responses have been quite considerable. The re-
sponse to liberalizations in agriculture and in the manufacturing subsectors
that are more modern and oriented more toward intermediate-goods produc-
tion has been particularly positive. The more traditional and consumer-
in oriented manufacturing subsectors, in contrast, have been unable to meet the
increased competition associated with liberalization. This failureisall the
fid more striking since protection for many of the latter subsectors dates back to
the nineteenth century. p
iv. The responses described in the preceding paragraph create somewhat
of a dilemma for the government, given industrialization as one of its objec-
er tives. Although manufacturing grew considerably in the early years of re-
strictiveness following the Great Depression, it has stagnated in recent decades
and has declined in its share of product and of labor-force absorption. Further
ed restrictiveness does not promise future development. Liberalization, on the
in other hand, involves considerable short- and medium-run costs until greater
efficiency is induced in traditional industries or resources are turned aside from
them. For the transitional period some direct subsidization might be necessary.242 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
Given the fiscal problems of the government, however, this alternative can be
used only with great care.
v. There is little empirical support for a relationship between subsectoral
resource allocation and EPRs or for other price ratios of final to intermediate
product partially because factors other than price ratios are important in
capacity-utilization and capacity-creation decisions. The poor correlation may
also reflect erratic changes in the price-related measures occasioned by the use
of quantitative restrictions.
vi. The international economic regimes have had significant implications
for resource allocation. Nevertheless, care must be taken not to exaggerate the F
expected gains from policy improvements in foreign sectors as compared with
those in the domestic area.
10.1 LONG-RUN TRENDS AND PHASE-
RELATED PATTERNS IN RESOURCE
ALLOCATION
Table A. 1 contains the mean composition of value added by sector for phases
and subphases between 1908 and 1971 (lines 3.1.1.1—3.1.1.3). The sub-
sectoral breakdown of value added and of total value of manufacturing in
1957, 1962, and 1967 is given in Table 10.1.
10.1.1Industrial Production by Sector.
AGRICULTURE.
The secular trend in the share of agriculture in production clearly has been
downward (line 3.1.1.1 in Table A.1).2 The same trend exists for the agricul-
tural percentage share of the labor force: 36.2 in 1920, 34.8 in 1945, and 28.2
in 1965. In part these declines reflect an Engel-curve phenomenon. The income
elasticity of the demand for domestic agricultural goods is smaller than the
income elasticity for all goods.
The faffing share of agriculture is not due to relative income elasticities
alone, however. It also reflects the response of capacity and capacity utilization
to the disincentives for production created by recent international economic
regimes (Table 5.2, colunm 2, and tables 9.1 and 12.1). Numerous policies
have had the intent of shifting resources into industry and of mitigating infla-
tionary pressures by keeping agricultural prices low. Partially because of such
policies not only has the agricultural share of product steadily fallen, but Chile
has changed from a major agricultural exporter in the nineteenth century to a
net importer of basic agricultural commodities. One unintended result of these
V-. V - r . .
VRESOURCE ALLOCATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 243
TABLE10.1





Proportion of Proportion of of 1962
Manufacturing Manufacturing Total
Value Added Total Value
ValueTotal






















Basic metals % 0.1090.0440.1650.0930.0400.229
Metal products 0.04 10.0450.0460.0350.03 60,03 9




















244 IMPACTOF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
policies, thus, has been to add to balance-of-payment pressures by increasing i
the need for basic imported foodstuffs.3
The agricultural share of production also has responded to medium-term
fluctuations in the degree of liberalization. For two of the three liberalization p
attempts it increased on the average (line 3.1.1.1 in Table A.!).4 The esti-
mates in Table A.2, moreover, indicate significantly positive liberalization- ti
associated increments in the exponential growth rate of agricultural GDP.— F
and significantly negative ones for total GDP. The greater the degree of
liberalization, thus, the greater the apparent extent of both short- and long-run




Thesecular trend for the shareof mining in total GDP also has been
downward (line 3.1.1.2 in Table A. 1)Thesame downward movement again d
is found for the percentage share of mining in the labor force: 5.1 in 1930, 5.4 a
in 1945, and 4.2 in 1965. Engel curves do not aid much in explaining this
decline. The response of capacity and capacity utilization to policies which a
generally discriminated against mining and in favor of manufacturing, however, j
again was important (Tables 9.1 and 12.1). Such policies, in fact, were even
less favorable toward mining than toward agriculture (columns 2 and 3 in
Table 5.2), and their impact on the balance of payments again was negative— C
this time by reducing exports (see Chapter 7).
Both the mean shares of GDP for phases (line 3.1.1.2 in Table A. 1) and
the estimated deviation from the secular exponential growth rates (Table A.2)
suggest a negative impact of liberalization on GDP in mining! This result,
prima facie, is quite surprising given the lessening of discrimination against
this sector at the start of liberalization attempts (column 3 in Table 5.2). In
fact, however, it largely reflects coincidental relative price movements. In the
1956—58 liberalization, for example, the volume of copper production in- i
creased significantly, and copper was the dominant mining product.6 But the
• copper price fell so much that the relative contribution of mining to GDP 1
dropped despite the expansion of production in quantity terms. For this sector 1
—and for this sector alone—fluctuations in the shares of GDP may be quite
misleading indices of variations in real product.
MANUFACTURING. 1
• The secular trend for the share of manufacturing in GDP was fairly
strongly upward until the early 1950s, but has been downward ever since
(line 3.1.1.3 in Table A. 1)Thepercentage share of manufacturing in the
total work force reflects the same pattern: 15.2 in 1920 (including construc-
tion),18.4 in1945, 19.7 in 1952, and 18.0 in 1960.
Theincreased protection given manufacturing importsubstitution in the 1RESOURCEALLOCATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 245
1930s was an important factor in the early relative surge of industry.8 Accord-
ing to Muñoz's [1968:82] careful estimates, the share of import substitution in
real industrial growth in the period from 1927 to 1937—38 was 0.73, as com-
pared with a Chenery normal value of 0.17 (see Table 10.3, below). However,
for 1937—38 to 1952—53, Muñoz's estimate of the coefficient of import substi-
tution is only 0.15, as compared to a Chenery normal value of
For 1952—53 to 1963—64 his estimates imply very little net additional industrial
import substitution.
From a longer-run viewpoint, then, the protectionist policies generally
utilized after the Great Depression have been unsuccessful in a number of their
direct objectives regarding manufacturing. Since the Second World War,
import substitution has been quite limited. Since the early 1950s industrial
growth has been lower than over-all growth. At the same time this sector has
declined relatively in its labor absorption, thereby adding to the unemployment
and underemployment problems of the 1960s and 1970s.'°
From a shorter-run perspective, nevertheless, there appears to have been
an inverse association between the degree of liberalization and the relative
importance of industry in resource utilization and in production. During the
past two decades, for example, the mean share of industry in GDP has fallen
or remained constant with each liberalization effort and has risen or remained
constant with each more restrictive phase or subphase (line 3.1.1.3 in Table
A. 1) •11Thisphase association reflects a definite response in industrial capacity
utilization to the reduced favoritism that has accompanied liberalization, and
vice versa (see Tables 6.2 and 9.1). Many of the industries that developed
behind high protective barriers have not been able to compete very well when
those barriers have been lowered. Rather than make their production more
efficient or allow resource shifts to other subsectors, moreover, they have found
it more effective to push for the reinstitution of higher barriers for competing
products.
B The combination of short-run and long-run considerations thus leaves a
policy dilemma. Highly protectionist policies have realized sharply diminishing
returns in Chilean industrialization efforts. Yet the inflow of competing prod-
e uctsaccompanying a liberalization causes a reduction in the utilization of
existing industrial capacity. To make Chilean manufacturing efficient might
require a prolonged period of liberalization so that expectations of a return to
higher barriers for competing products would be dissipated. But such an ap-
proach entails substantial short-term economic and political costs.
ALL OTHER SECTORS -
Forall other sectors—mostly services, but including construction—the
• secular trend in the share of resources absorbed has been positive. The mean
percentage of total GDP originating in these sectors has increased steadily: 57
L
*r
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for 1908—51, 61 for 1952—61, and 64 for 1962—71 (based on lines 3.1.1.1—
3.1.1.3 in Table A.1). The same trend is evident in the percentage of the labor
force absorbed by these sectors: 41.4 in 1945, 44.2 in 1952, and 47.7 in
1960. Numerous Chilean observers have been preoccupied for some time by
the large size of the service sector and by this shift from goods to services.
The causes of this shift are quite complex and hard to identify because the
service sector has so many heterogeneous components. In the context of the
present study, however, one hypothesis merits mention. Higher quantitative
restrictions tend to raise the share of services per unit of foreign trade because
they increase the paper work required by traders for each unit of trade; they
cause a substantial increase in the expected private returns from lobbying for •
exceptionsto the regime or for reclassification of traded goods; and they
require a substantial government bureaucracy for monitoring and enfofcing
the restrictions. Thus, unless such increased services per unit of trade are offset
by. reductions in trade, intensified quantitative restrictions would contribute
to the shift from goods to services.
A very crude test of this hypothesis from a long-run viewpoint is to
examine the secular path of the share of GDP service production to see if it
rose substantially in periods during which quantitative restrictions intensified
significantly. The percentage shares of GDP cited above do not provide sup-
port for this hypothesis. The largest increment in the share of nonmerchandise
production occurred not in the 1930s, when quantitative restrictions increased
the most, but in the 1950s and 1960s, when three liberalization efforts were
made. This test is very weak, however, because ceteris paribus conditions are
not maintained.
Taken over a shorter run, the same test leads to ambiguous results. The
mean share of services increased in the more restrictive years of 1952—55 and
1962—64, but fell in 1971.12 It fell in the quite liberal 1959—61 period, but rose
during the 1956—58 and 1965—70 liberalizations. For annual data simple
regressions of the ratios of major components of the service sector to the mer-
chandise sector, moreover, generally do not indicate a significant role for
various indices of quantitative restrictions.13
The general-equilibrium model of Chapter 2 provides a much more satis-
factory tool for examining this hypothesis. Under the assumption that the
model captures the structure of the Chilean economy, an intensification of
quantitative restrictions results in a substantial short- and medium-run shift
from services to goods! The first-year elasticity of the goods-to-services ratio
with respect to quantitative restrictions is 0.8, and that for the third-year is 1.4
(line 3.5.4 for simulation 2.3.1 in Table A.!!). The expansion of agricultural
and industrial production induced by greater quantitative restrictions outweighs
the hypothesized effects on services.
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overvaluation has contributed to the shift from goods to services. Devaluation,
ceteris paribus, reverses that shift—especially if the NER for large-scale mining
is devalued (simulations 2.1.1—2.1.3 and 2.6.1). This impact would at least
partially offset that of reduced quantitative restrictions in a program combining
liberalization with devaluation.
10.1.2Manufacturing Subsectors.
The manufacturing sector is of particular interest since industrialization
per se has long been an objective of Chilean policy. Systematic analysis of the
impact of international economic regimes on subsectors of manufacturing is
beyond the scope of this study because of the difliculties of maintaining ceteris
paribus conditions. Nevertheless, the examination of long-run trends and
short-run phase associations in the composition of manufacturing may be
suggestive.
From a long-run viewpoint, it is worth noting, first, subsectoral growth
rates in real industrial production before and after the Great Depression (col-
umns 1 and 2 in Table 10.2) and, second, Mufioz's [1968:82] estimates of
import-substitution coefficients for 1914—15 to 1963—64 and for various sub-
periods (Table 10.3).
TABLE 10.2
Chilean Mean Percentage Growth Rates of Manufacturing Subsectors for
Selected Years, 1914—65, and for First Year of Three Periods of Liberalization
r
1952— 1956— 1959— 1962— 1956,
1914— .1937— 55 58 61 64 1959,
27 65 Phase IIPhase IIIPhase IVPhase II1965
Subsectors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Food 3.2 3.6 4.5 —2.4 11.3 5.2 —0.7
Beverages 2.3 5.9 4.9 9.6 15.8 1.4 9.6
Tobacco 6.5 —0.1 8.4 0.7 —4.0 0.8 9.5
Textiles 4.3 4.9 3.4 0.6 11.9 8.7 7.3
Clothingandfootwear5.3 1.2 0.1 —0.8 —1.5 1.6 2.5
Furniture and wood
products 1.0 2.1 3.0 —3.2 8.6 6.4 —3.8
Paper, paper products,
and printing 4.0 5.6 2.1 20.4 15.6 2.2 9.9
Leather and rubber
products 3.6 3.9 0.9 0.1 16.5 5.0 5.1
Chemicals 4.8 8.9 5.4 18.5 12.7 3.0 1.5
Nonmetallic minerals3.9 6.1 —3.4 9.4 15.4 6.8 11.4
Metal products 9.7 7.9 3.6 1.8 6.1 11.8 9.8
SouRcE: Calculatedfromdata inMuñoz [1968:160—161].
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The manufacturing subsectors in order of the degree to which the mean
growth rate in the more restrictive period, 1937—65, exceeded that for 1914—27
are chemicals, beverages, nonmetallic minerals, paper and printing, furniture
and wood products, textiles, food, leather and rubber products, metal products,
clothing and footwear, and tobacco (column 2 less column 1 in Table 10.2).
With a few obvious exceptions (e.g., beverages and metal products) this order-
ing suggests a shift from traditional, consumption-oriented subsectors to more
modern, intermediate-goods industries. Such a change is consistent with stated
government priorities.
That more restrictive international economic regimes caused this shift,
however, is questionable. The Muñoz import-substitution coefficients (Table
( 10.3) indicate that most import substitution took place before1937.Thus,
import substitution was not a major determinant of growth in the 1937—65
period.Anotherway of making the same point is to note that the correlation
between growth rates and import-substitution coefficients by industrial sub-
sector is not significantly nonzero.'4
From a shorter-run viewpoint the question arises of the extent to which
changes in industrial composition have been phase associated. Table 10.1 pro-
vides some data pertinent to this question: 1957 and 1967 were in Phase III
periods and 1962 was in a more restrictive Phase II regime. Industries that
were relatively flourishing under liberalization, therefore, might be expected
to have had a larger share of manufacturing value added in 1957 and 1967
than in 1962. However, the breakdown obtained by classifying sectors on this
basis does not suggest any interesting patterns.
The mean growth rates over phases also provides information about
medium-run compositional changes (columns 3—6 in Table 10.2). Among the
11 manufacturing subsectors included in the table, mean growth rates for the
more liberal phases exceed those for the more restrictive phases by at least 5
per cent in five cases (in order)—paperproducts and printing, chemicals, non-
metallic minerals, beverages, and leather and rubber products (columns 4 plus
5lessthe sum of columns 3 and 6). The opposite is true for two subsectors—
tobacco and metal products. These patterns suggest, first, that mean growth
rates for industrial subsectors were higher in the more liberal years 1956—61
than in the Phase II periods immediately preceding and following. This oc- t
curred even though all but four subsectors experienced relatively low rates of
growth during the 1956—58 Ibañez-Klein-Saks attempt at stabilization plus
liberalization. For the first year of the three liberalization attempts, moreover, a
comparison of columns 7 and 2 indicates that the average growth rates ex-
ceeded the secular trend for all but three of the industrial subsectors (food,
furniture and wood products, and chemicals). The frequent charge that lib-
eralization implied widespread slowdowns in the manufacturing sector, thus,
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TABLE 10.3













































































































SouRcE: Mufloz [1968:82]. The import-substitution coefficient is defined as (U,— u1)
Z,/(X,—X,),where uisthe ratio of imports to total supply, Z is total supply, X is the
gross internal product, and the subscripts refer to the endpoints of the period in question.
The values in parentheses are the "normal" values based on Chenery [1960].
Second, the subsectors with higher growth rates in the more liberal phase
relative to less liberal ones tended to be more modem and oriented more
toward production of intermediate goods. The long-protected consumer-
oriented subsectors tended to perform relatively less well under liberalization.
These patterns point to the failure of many "infant" industries in the latter
group to gain sufficient maturity to compete successfully in the world market.
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(e
10.2RELATIONS BETWEEN RESOURCE
ALLOCATION AND PRICE RATIOS OF si
FINAL TO INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT si
In the past decade there has been considerable debate over the extent to which
EPRs and related price ratios of final to intermediate product might indicate ii
incentives for resource allocation (see Appendix B for references to this litera-
ture). By the early 1970s it had been established that these measures did not
provide theoretically reliable indicators under a wide set of apparently reason-
able assumptions. Nevertheless, the question remains whether or not such
measures have actually been associated with resource movements.
Evidence bearing on this question is presented below. For the most part, I
it requires strong ceteris paribus assumptions. Taken together, it lends very nc
little empirical support for the relations sometimes hypothesized between price- fl(
related measures of the ratio of final to intermediate product (such as EPRs)
and resource allocation.'5 In part, this reflects the impact of a number of other se
important factors that simultaneously interact within the economic system. In to
addition, it may reflect the effect of frequent and often bizarre changes in the re
EPRs resulting from the widespread use of quantitative restrictions.16 fr
i. Compositional changes in manufacturing value added do not appear to 2.
have been associated with subsectoral EPR levels or changes.
ii. Hachette provides data for 1959—61 from which the average 2.
change in customs barriers and the standard deviation in the annual values of
those changes can be calculated. However, neither of these variables was found
to be significantly correlated with industrial subsectoral growth over the same Si
period. n
iii.Sectoral ITRs for 1967 and changes in 1TRs between 1957 and 1967 e:
are significantly correlated with the increase in value added between 1957 and St
1967 (Tables A.5 and A.6). Changes in ITRs also are significantly correlated
with additions to capacity in terms of horsepower in the same decade. Neither al
the levels nor the changes in EPRs, however, are significantly correlated with di
any index of relative growth in output or in resource allocation.
iv. Using the general-equilibrium model of Chapter 2,it is possible to
explore the effect on sectoral resource allocation when price ratios of final to tc
intermediate product vary (lines 3.1.1—3.1.3 in Table A. 11). Changes in re- E
• source allocation are indicated by changes in the allocation of the labor force ol
(lines 3.2.1—3.2.3), capital stock (lines 3.3.1—3.3.3), production capacity fi,
(lines 3.4. 1—3.4.3), and GDP (lines 3.5.1—3.5.4). Examination of the simula- fo
tion results leads to a striking finding: in a large number of cases relative P
• changes in the price ratios of final to intermediate product are in different direc- e:
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(e.g., simulations 1.1, 1.2, 2.1.1, 2.1.3, 2.2, and 2.3.1)! Upon reflection, of
course, such a result should not seem surprising, since many determinants be-
sides relative prices enter into capacity-utilization and capacity-creation deci-
sions (see subsections 9.2.2, 9.2.3, and 12.2.3.1).
10.3COSTS OF ATTEMPTS TO ALTER
RESOURCE ALLOCATION THROUGH
bt DIFFERENTIAL INCENTIVES CREATED
BY THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMiC
REGIMES
The implication of the previous section is not that foreign-sector regimes have
not affected resource allocation but only that EPRs and related measures do
not provide very good indications of the direction of such effects.
The general-equilibrium model of Chapter 2, in fact, suggests that foreign-
• sector policies have had substantial impact on resource allocation among sec-
In the short and medium run, for example, higher quantitative restrictions
le result in shifts primarily into industry, secondarily into agriculture, and away
from mining and services (lines 3.4.1—3.4.3 and 3.5.1—3.5.4 for simulation
• 2.3.1 in Table A. 11). Below-equilibrium NERs, similarly, cause shifts pri-
marily into industry, but also into agriculture relative to mining (simulation
2.1.3).
The costs of such shifts, of course, include the extent to which their oc-
currence reduced the degree of attainment of all other objectives. Without a
social welfare function such trade-offs cannot be evaluated. Evaluation of costs
normally focuses, therefore, on the amount of forgone output. Output appar-
ently was lost by the shift in resources from mining to industry.17 Under the
d strong assumption that wages have been proportional to marginal product, for
ti example, the mean marginal product in mining averaged over 20 per cent
above that for industry in the quarter century from 1945 to 1969. Within in-
dustries, moreover, the range of DRCs shown in Table 5.3 suggests that the
international economic regimes caused some shifts into inefficient production.18
Balassa [1971: 82] calculates the over-all static cost of Chilean protection
to have been 1.4 per cent of national income on the basis of Jeanneret's 1961
EPR estimates (EPR 1 in Table 5.3). He also estimates that the total net cost
• of protection in that year was a substantially larger 6.2 per cent. To obtain this
figure he adds to the static effect 9.6 per cent for dynamic cost and 0.6 per cent
- forthe consumption effect.'9 These are partially offset by additions of —3.5
e per cent for a terms-of-trade effect and —1.9 per cent for the cost of increased
- exportsunder free trade.
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alone—would be regarded as surprisingly small, given the degree of distortion
indicated in Table 5.3, if it were not for a number of other similar estimates c
made over the past fifteen years. Furthermore, on the basis of conservative
estimates in Behrman [1973b], the mean forgone output in underutilized Ca-
pacity due primarily to domestic policies has been greater—even if Balassa's
dynamic costs are included. Some significant output gains thus may be possible
from a more liberalized trade policy. But improvements in other policies—
such as anticyclical ones—may have higher benefits. The potential gains in
output from resource allocation due to changes in the international economic
regime should not be exaggerated.2°
f
NOTES
1. The extent to which manufacturing has been favored relative to agriculture is one
important exception (see subsection 5.1.2).
2. For 1940—65 the secular growth rate for real agricultural GDP was 0.02 as
compared to 0.038 for total real GDP (Table A.2).
3. For some countries increased imports of basic foodstuffs would be suggested by
comparative-advantage considerations. A large number of agricultural economists, how-
ever, have agreed that Chile has a comparative advantage in the production of many
basic foodstuffs (for example, see Schultz [1968]).
4. During the third attempt (1965—70) it decreased slightly, but this may be part
of the secular trend and not a fluctuation due to a change in the foreign-sector regime.
In general, the increases occurred despite the first-year drops in the PLD-EER(PI)s for
agriculture relative to industry, that are described in section 5.2, above. For the 1956—58
liberalization, Crosson [1970] explains that the price ratio of agricultural output to input
rose even though the price ratio of agriculture to total manufacturing fell. Therefore,
there were price incentives for expanding agricultural production.
5. For 1940—65 the secular growth rate for mining was 0.018 as compared with
0.03 8 for total real GDP (Table A.2).
6. See the discussion of the impact of the Nuevo Trato in subsection 7.1.2.3.
7. The estimates in Table A.2 suggest that for the entire 1940—65 period the mean d
exponential growth rate for real industrial GDP has been the same as for total product
—0.038.
8. Domestic policies also at times played important roles in the structure of incen-
tives for import substitution. For example, the shift from production to sales taxes, en-
acted in Law 11575 of August 14,1954, implied an increase in EPRs because the
production tax had been basically on goods produced by domestic industries.
9. The Instituto de EconomIa [1963:2, 91 suggests that during World War II sub-
stantial import substitution occurred because of shortages of imported supplies. A finding
that considerable import substitution may have occurred then and in the subsequent
subphases in an absolute sense would not be inconsistent with the relative estimates of
Muñoz, given that the rate of growth of industrial product was two to three times as
high in the three subphases after 1940 as in 193 1—39 (line 5.2 in Table A.l).
10. For these reasons Mamalakis [1971:214—217, 370—371] also has serious doubts
about the structuralists' characterization of Chilean industrialization as being relatively
successful.
-
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11.Table A.2 provides further support for this characterization. The only signifi-
candy positive deviation from the exponential growth rate for industrial GDP in 1940—65
is for the 1940—55 Phase H period, and the only significantly negative one is for the
1959—61 Phase IV years.
a- 12.The mean share of services is given by 1.0 minus the sum of lines 3.1.1.1—3.1.1.3
L's inTableA.I.
1
13.Only in the regression of the ratio of the size of government to industrial pro-
e ductionis a significantly nonzero coefficient of the Ffrench-Davis QR index obtained.
The significantly nonzero deviations from the exponential growth rates for GDP
Ifl in Table A.2 also are ambiguous. Construction had a negative deviation for the Phase
111940—55period. Services had a negative deviation for the 1956—1958 liberalization.
Government had a positive deviation for the 1940—55 Phase II years, but a negative one
for the 1962—64 Phase II period.
14. In fact if the coefficient of determination between these two series is corrected
for degrees of freedom, it becomes negative.
15. Taylor and Black [1973] also find that EPR measures often are poor indicators
of the magnitude and sometimes of the sign of resource shifts among Chilean subsectors
owing to reductions in import taxes.
16. In the real world, not only does domestic policy keep changing, but it takes
as time for adjustments to these changes to work themselves out.
17. Restriction of mining output might have been an optimal strategy had Chile
by been able to exploit her limited market power in copper without retaliation. Until the
late 1960s, however, she was not able to do so because of the foreign locus of decision-
making in large-scale mining.
18. An extreme case of inefficiency due to the international economic regime was
the restriction of the automobile industry to Arica in northern Chile by the special
regime for that area. Johnson [1967] describes the state of this industry as of 1965. He
notes the considerable problems of seasonality due to the difficulties of obtaining both
-58 domestic and foreign imputs as well as the pressure to produce before the end of each
calendaryear so that the annually increasing national-component requirements could be
met. He estimates that the trade-off between local resources used and the dollars saved
was as high as 4 to 1 at the official NER or 2.4 to I at the black-market NER (although
ith he suggests that the elimination of extraordinary rents might lower these estimates
somewhat).
19. The relatively large dynamic effect is based on the assumption that those in-
dustries which continued after a switch to free trade would do so with production costs
which declined to competitive levels. This dynamic effect, however, does not include
some important possible benefits of openness, such as greater exposure to technical
progress and innovation. Thus, it may understate the true benefits of liberalization. For
more details concerning this and other calculations see Balassa [1971:80—82].
he 20. In Chapter 12 I return to the question of the beneficial effects of liberalization
on economic growth.
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